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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellant presents six issues on appeal: 
Issue No. 1: First, whether the trial court erred in its determination that a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract, signed by only one of the two known joint tenants, constituted an unaccepted 
offer that did not create an interest in real property. This determination by the lower court is one 
of fact and law since the lower court considered extrinsic evidence to interpret the REPC. "We 
uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless they are 'clearly erroneous.'" Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'nofUtah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). The subsequent interpretation of the law is 
reviewed for correctness. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Brook Nuttall could not 
require Vanessa Nuttall to sell her interest in the property. This issue was not decided by 
the lower court, but if it had been, the determination in this regard is one of law, reviewed 
for correctness. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr.. Inc.. 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in holding that notice to a party's legal 
counsel is sufficient to constitute notice to the party required under the wrongful lien 
statute. The lower court's determination in this regard is one of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in awarding treble damages to Vanessa 
4 
Nuttall under the wrongful lien statute. "The award of damages is a factual determination 
that we review for clear error." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 
2006). 
Issue No. 5: Whether the trial court erred in awarding Vanessa Nuttall all her 
claimed attorney fees. The amount of Vanessa's attorneys fess was not challenged in the 
court below; nonetheless, if it were appealable, the standard of review of a trial couifs 
award of attorney fees is for "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
Issue No, 6: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Brook 
Nuttall on Plaintiffs first cause of action. This decision is not yet ripe for appeal, but the 
lower court's determination in this regard is one of law, reviewed for correctness. Nova 
Casualty Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant Centennial Investment Company, LLC (hereinafter "CIC") 
located property in Herriman, Salt Lake County, Utah, that was for sale by the Defendants 
Brook and Vanessa Nuttall, who owned the property as joint tenants. In early May 2005, 
CIC entered into negotiations and ultimately a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") 
with Brook to purchase the property. After failing to convince Vanessa to ratify Brooke's 
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signature and agree to sell the property, and after the Nuttalls had subsequently entered 
into a contract to sell the property to Oakridge Development, CIC sued the Nuttalls for 
breach of contract (including a prayer for specific performance) and for fraud. 
In August 2005, as the closing with Oakridge Development drew near, CIC filed a 
Notice of Interest on the Herriman property with the County Recorder's Office. Upon 
discovering the Notice of Interest, Vanessa served a demand on CIC to release the notice 
so the Nuttalls could close their sale with Oakridge. CIC failed to remove the Notice of 
Interest, and Vanessa Nuttall sought judicial intervention in the lawsuit CIC previously 
filed. 
The Course of the Proceedings 
Vanessa Nuttall moved the court for an expedited hearing on her Motion to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien. The lower court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion in conjunction 
with motions to dismiss (converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment) submitted by 
both Vanessa and Brook. The lower court granted Vanessa's Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Dismiss in full, and granted her Motion to Nullify Wrongful Lien, but 
reserved the issue of damages and attorney's fees for a later date. The lower court also 
granted Brook summary judgment on CIC's claim for breach of contract, but denied the 
motion as to fraud. The court subsequently entered an order dismissing all claims as to 
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Vanessa, granting the motion to nullify, declaring the same void ab initio, and dismissing 
one of the claims against Brook. 
At a later hearing to assess Vanessa's damages, the lower court received evidence 
and awarded treble damages and attorney's fees to Vanessa pursuant to the Wrongful 
Lien statute, but specifically did not address Vanessa's argument for attorney's fees based 
on bad faith. Pursuant to the lower court's instruction, counsel for Vanessa prepared an 
order and judgment, which the court signed on December 20, 2005. 
Vanessa subsequently sought recovery on the judgment by seeking a writ of 
execution on real property belonging to CIC. CIC failed in an attempt to quash the writ 
of execution. The court issued a ruling on CIC's motion to quash on April 10, 2006, 
wherein the court indicated that its December 20, 2005 ruling was intended as a final 
judgment on the matters between CIC and Vanessa Nuttall. The Court indicated that its 
ruling constituted a final order between CIC and Vanessa and instructed counsel for 
Vanessa to prepare an amended judgment and order. Counsel prepared a proposed order, 
and CIC objected thereto and moved the lower court to stay the matter pending resolution 
of CIC's claims against Brook Nuttall. On May 16, 2006, the Court issued a subsequent 
minute entry and order on the objection and clarified that its intent in signing the 
December 20, 2005 Judgment and Order, as well as the court's intent in issuing its April 
10, 2006 ruling was clarify that the order dismissing all claims against Vanessa, in 
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conjunction with the judgment, constitute a final judgment. The court also granted a 10-
day stay of the matter. CIC filed this appeal to review the Court's minute entry and order 
ofMay 16,2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Vanessa Nuttall was divorced from Defendant Brook Nuttall by decree dated April 
10, 2003. Record (hereinafter "R.") at 10,13. 
2. When Vanessa and Book divorced, they remained joint owners of roughly 5.18 
acres of property in Herriman, Utah. The divorce decree provides that Brook and 
Vanessa must mutually consent to any sale of the property to a third party. R. 10, TJ4 A 
True and correct copy of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment was attached to Vanessa's 
affidavit. R. 16-18. 
3. Vanessa first became aware of the Plaintiffs offer to purchase the entire property 
on the same day Brook Nuttall signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract, May 5, 2005. R. 
10, [^5. The REPC is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
4. On May 9, 2005, Vanessa spoke with CIC's representative, Mr. Travis Bell, 
regarding the Plaintiffs offer to purchase the entire 5 acres. In that phone conversation, 
Vanessa made it very clear to Mr. Bell that she did not intend to sign anything, or reach 
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any agreement until she had the opportunity to have an attorney, or other knowledgeable 
third party advise her regarding the offer and its ramifications. R. 10, f 6. 
5. At no time did Mr. Bell ever indicate to Vanessa that he understood that Brook had 
sole authority to sell the 5 acres without Vanessa's consent. R. 11, ^8. 
6. At no time did Vanessa authorize Brook Nuttall to act on her behalf, or sign 
anything for her regarding the sale of the property in dispute. R. 11, ^|9. 
7. Mr. Bell set an appointment to meet with Vanessa on May 10, 2005, to discuss the 
offer just before Vanessa was to leave to work. Shortly before the appointment, Mr. Bell 
called and Vanessa informed him that she was running late, so Mr. Bell responded that 
the two could meet on May 11, 2005. R. 11, ^10. 
8. Vanessa heard nothing further from Mr. Bell, or any other person representing CIC 
until May 25, 2005. Vanessa was very surprised that Mr. Bell did not follow-up on the 
Plaintiffs pending offer. Since nobody followed up regarding the offer, Vanessa did not 
think that the CIC was interested anymore. R. 11,111. 
9. Vanessa never met with Mr. Bell, or anyone else representing the Plaintiff, 
regarding the Plaintiffs offer to buy the entire 5 acres. R. 11, 112. 
10. Mr. Bell never even gave Vanessa a copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract that 
Brook had signed. R. 11,113. 
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11. On May 24, 2005, Brook and Vanessa signed a contract to sell the 5 acres to 
Oakridge Development, Inc. R. 11, f 14. 
12. On May 25, 2005, Mr. Bell left a message on Vanessa's mobile phone that he 
wanted to meet with Vanessa to discuss the Plaintiffs offer and that he wanted her to sign 
a contract. Vanessa was very surprised to get a call from Mr. Bell since She thought that 
after half a month with no inquiry regarding CIC's offer, that Centennial Investment 
Company was no longer interested in the property. R. 11-12, ^[15. 
13. On May 27, 2005, Mr. Bell called Vanessa again and wanted to set up a time to 
meet to discuss the Plaintiffs offer. Vanessa told him that she and Brook had already 
rejected the offer, and that they had already sold the property to another party. This is 
further evidenced by the Release of Earnest Money (R. 20) that Brook and Vanessa had 
signed on May 25, 2005 releasing CIC's earnest money. R. 12, [^16. 
14. While knowing that the property had already been put under contract for a sale to a 
third party, Mr. Bell repeatedly called Vanessa's mobile phone, and left numerous 
threatening messages about the property. He said that unless Vanessa caved in and signed 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract, he would sue her and Brook to make sure they could 
not sell the property to anyone else. R. 12, [^17. 
15. Vanessa spoke with Mr. Bell again during the afternoon of May 27, 2005, and 
once again informed him that she never agreed to sell the property to the Plaintiff, and 
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that after Mr. Bell had failed to contact her for over two weeks, she understood that 
Centennial Investment Company was no longer interested in the property. Vanessa 
informed him further that she would not sign his Real Estate Purchase Contract because 
she had already contracted to sell the land to a third party. R. 12-13, f 18. 
16. Vanessa never consented to the Plaintiffs offer to buy the property, and never 
made any agreement to sell it to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Vanessa never signed the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, or made any type of agreement with CIC that she would 
sign it. Vanessa merely consented to read over the contract and make a decision on it. R. 
13,H19. 
17. When the lawsuit was brought before the lower court, Vanessa did not own a 
home, but was in the process of having a home built in Herriman. R. 13, ^21. 
18. As a single mother, Vanessa worked only part time, but she had been approved for 
a home loan of $70,000 through Beehive Credit Union. R. 13, [^22. 
19. In order to finance her home, which was estimated to cost approximately 
$170,000, Vanessa had planned to get a $70,000 loan from Beehive Credit Union, and 
pay $100,000 from the equity that she expected to receive when she was to close the 
pending sale of the 5 acres to Oakridge Development, Inc., set for August 22, 2005. R. 
13,1(23. 
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20. Without closing the sale of the 5 acres, Vanessa would have had no way of 
affording the home she had begun building in reliance on the pending sale to Oakridge. 
R. 14, f24. 
21. The matter came before the lower court on September 6, 2005, for hearing on 
motions to dismiss (which were converted to Motions for Summary Judgment) from both 
Brook and Vanessa, and on Vanessa's motion to nullify wrongful lien. The court heard 
argument and received evidence from both sides., but continued the matter to September 
9, 2005 on all motions. R. 99. 
22. At the hearing on September 6, 2005, the Court received among other evidence, 
the following evidence: 
a. Evidence submitted addressed only the motion to nullify wrongful lien (see 
Transcript of September 6, 2005 hearing, hereinafter "T 9/6/05" at 2:19-25, 7:18-
23. 
b. Both sides agreed to and submitted evidence to the Court by proffer (T 
9/6/05 at 4:8-15). 
c. The deed (R. 228-229) used to convey the subject property to the Nuttalls 
indicated that the property was sold to both Brook and Vanessa (T 9/6/05 at 8:3-
16). 
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d. The lower court noted that deed submitted as evidence had a tax card 
attached to it (R. 230) identifying the owners of property as Brook and Vanessa as 
joint tenants since 1996 (T 9/6/05 at 8:20-9:2). 
e. Brook signed a REPC with CIC on May 5, 2005. T 9/6/05 at 13:2-9. 
f. The REPC itself was defective and by its very terms CIC's offer had lapsed 
before the Nuttall's could accept or reject the offer to purchase. The REPC 
contained offer open to acceptance by March 6, 2004, but Brook's acceptance was 
on May 5, 2005 - thus the offer lapsed before partial acceptance by Brook. (T 
9/6/05 at 41:2-6)(see also the REPC at R. 251 attached hereto as Addendum l)i. 
g. . Vanessa was never involved in negotiations with CIC, nor did she ever sign 
the REPC (T 9/6/05 at 12:23-13:1). 
h. CIC filed a Notice of Interest on August 10, 2005; months after its 
inoperative offer had been expressly rejected (T 9/6/05 at 13:18-24). 
i. Vanessa caused a demand letter to be faxed on August 18, 2005 to CIC via 
its attorney Mr. Turner. The facsimile was confirmed by confirmation receipt that 
it was received that same day. T 9/6/05 at 18:21-19:8. 
l In argument, counsel for Vanessa indicated that even if the erroneous date were 
inadvertent, the error existed, and made the REPC inoperative on it's face as a matter of 
law. T 9/6/05 at 12:18-20. 
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j . The lower court received evidence that the closing with Oakridge 
Development was delayed 28 days by the notice of interest (T 9/6/05 at 24:16-
26:3). 
k. Brook told Travis Bell that Vanessa was a joint tenant owner of the 
property and that CIC had to get Vanessa's signature in order to seal the deal (T 
9/6/05 at 32:2-4). 
23. From the very first inquiry about the property, long before signing anything, Brook 
repeatedly informed Mr. Bell of the need to obtain Vanessa's signature. He reminded Mr. 
Bell of this upon signing as well (R. 49-51 6, 8, 10 and 12). 
24. The lower court again received evidence at the hearing on September 9, 2005, 
wherein the evidence received, included: 
a. The Affidavits submitted in this case were considered by the court for all 
motions (see Transcript of September 9, 2005 hearing, hereinafter "T 9/9/05" at 
42:5-8). 
b. Mr. Turner admitted that Vanessa could not be compelled to sell her interest 
in the property: 
THE COURT: So are you saying that in this case Ms. Nuttall cannot 
be compelled to sell the property. Is that what you're telling me? 
MR. TURNER: But so setting aside the divorce decree, then that 
would be exactly our position. 
T 9/9/05 at 46:24-47-6. 
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c. Travis Bell had no knowledge of the provisions of the Nuttalls' divorce 
decree at time of signing or at the time CIC filed its complaint (T 9/9/05 at 48:12-
16). 
d. The lower court considered the REPC on its face, except it did consider 
parole evidence submitted by affidavit from Travis Bell, that CIC intended to 
purchase the entire property from both Vanessa and Brook, and that he repeatedly 
sought to obtain Vanessa's signature (T 9/9/05 at 73:22-74:4). 
25. Based on the evidence presented in the Affidavits, and received in open-court, the 
lower court found that: 
a. "On May 5, 2005, Travis Bell was aware that Vanessa Nuttall owned the 
property with Brook L. Nuttall." R. 298, | 5 . 
b. Travis Bell attempted to obtain Vanessa's signature, but failed to do so. R. 
299,1Hf6-7. 
c. Vanessa never gave Brook or anyone else authority to sell her interest in the 
property. R. 299,^8 
d. CIC filed its Notice of Interest on August 10, 2005. R. 299, f7. 
26. Based on the undisputed portions of the affidavits and its findings, the lower court 
concluded: 
a. "Since the Real Estate Purchase Contract was not signed by both joint 
owners, the offer thereon did not ripen and never became a valid contract, and 
Plaintiff never had an interest in the real property." R. 299, %4. 
b. CIC's Notice of Interest was wrongful since CIC did not have an interest in 
the property, and since an encumbrance was not otherwise authorized by the 
Nuttalls, or by statute. R. 300, ffl[5-7. 
27. The lower court granted Vanessa's motion to nullify wrongful lien, her motion to 
dismiss, and reserved the issue of damages and attorney's fees for a subsequent hearing. 
R. 300, fflfl"5. The lower court's order is attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
28. Vanessa provided testimony to the court that due to the delay caused by the 
wrongful lien, she and Brook had to delay the closing of the sale of the Herriman property 
to Oakridge Development, Inc., from August 21 to September 19, 2005, or about 28 days. 
R. 278. 
29. Once Vanessa became aware the Plaintiffs Notice of Interest in Real Estate and its 
Lis Pendens were released on or about Friday September 16, 2005, she proceeded to have 
the transaction with Oakridge close as quickly as possible. Oakridge closed its purchase 
of the property on the following Monday, September 19, 2005. R. 278 
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30. On November 15, 2005, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
Vanessa's damages and attorney's fees, wherein it acknowledged the receipt of evidence 
from Vanessa via affidavit, and received among other details, the following evidence: 
a. The hearing was an evidentiary hearing (see Transcript of November 15, 
2005 hearing, hereinafter UT 11/15/05" at 6:14-16). 
b. The amount of actual damages as submitted in the affidavit of Vanessa 
Nuttall was not disputed (T 11/15/05 at 7:12-13). 
c. 28 days passed after demand was made on CIC before it released its lien (T 
11/15/05 at 8:1-6). 
d. Travis Bell repeatedly called Vanessa in attempt to get her signature (T 
11/15/05 at 8:19-25; see also R. 140, Bell Affidavit 122). 
e. Travis Bell knew in May that there was no deal with the Nuttalls; 
nonetheless he filed a notice of interest on August 10, 2005 (T 11/15/05 at 9:1-9; 
see also R. 140, Bell Affidavit f 25). 
f. Mr. Bell and Mr. Turner were involved in a prior wrongful lien suit, thus 
the claim of novice had no merit. In fact the ruling in that case was issued just 
days before this matter came before the lower court (T 11/15/05 at 9:17-11:10). 
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31. The lower court awarded Vanessa treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to 
Utah Code §38-9-4(2). R. 335-339. The lower court's memorandum decision detailing 
it's rational is attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
32. Importantly, the lower court determined that based on the facts in this case, service 
of the demand to release the wrongful lien on CIC's attorney, was service on CIC. R. 
337. 
33. The court also determined that the unchallenged attorney's fees incurred by 
Vanessa were reasonable. R. 337. 
34. The lower court also made it clear that since it was awarding attorney's fees and 
costs under Utah Code §38-9-4(2) "the Court is declining to consider any of the 
alternative theories for awarding attorney's fees, that are set forth in Vanessa NuttalPs 
pleadings in support of her motion." R. 338. 
35. Based on the lower court's decision, on December 20, 2005, Judge Adkin signed 
the judgment and order (filed 12/21/05) against CIC in favor of Vanessa Nuttall. The 
lower court's Judgment and Order is attached hereto as Addendum 4. 
36. Although it was not specified in the judgment and order of December 20, 2005, the 
lower court subsequently indicated that it intended the judgment and order as a final order 
as between Vanessa and CIC. R. 443. 
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37. After CIC failed to pay Vanessa for the judgment awarded in December 2005, 
Vanessa sought a writ of execution on the judgment. R. 353-355. CIC moved to quash 
the writ. R. 356-357. The lower court denied the motion to quash, and awarded Vanessa 
attorney's fees for defending against the motion to quash. R. 415-416. The lower court's 
ruling and order awarding Vanessa additional attorney's fees is attached hereto as 
Addendum 5. 
38. The Court issued a ruling and order on April 10, 2006 determining that there was 
no just reason for delay, and concluded that the entry of a final judgment in favor of 
Vanessa should be taken against CIC. R. 425-26. The lower court's April 10, 2006 
Ruling and Order is attached hereto as Addendum 6. 
39. After Vanessa submitted a proposed final judgment and order, CIC objected and 
moved for a stay of judgment (R. 428-431), and the Court entered a final Minute Entry 
and Order on May 16, 2006 (R. 443-448), which is attached hereto as Addendum 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CIC prepared a REPC that contained an offer that lapsed before Brook Nuttall 
signed it, thus the REPC never ripened into an offer that could have been accepted. 
Nonetheless, even if the REPC were valid, since CIC knew that it needed the consent of 
both owners to purchase the entire property, and since the clear intent was to purchase the 
entire property from both owners, and not just purchase Brook's Vi interest, the offer was 
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never accepted. Based on controlling precedent, CIC's REPC, even if it were operative, 
which it never was, did not create in CIC an interest in the property at issue, and therefore 
the Notice of Interest in Real Estate was wrongful pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-1. Thus 
the Court should affirm on Issue No. 1. 
Issue No. 2 on appeal was never decided by the lower court, and has improperly 
been brought before this court. Accordingly the Court should not address the issue. 
Because Utah's wrongful lien statute does not address the issue of serving demand 
for release of a wrongful lien on a party that is known to be represented by legal counsel, 
and because the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct strictly prohibit Vanessa's attorney 
from sidestepping Mr. Turner, and directly corresponding with CIC, the lower court 
correctly determined that service on CIC's attorney was service on CIC for purposes of 
the wrongful lien statute. Thus the Court should affirm on Issue No. 3. 
After demand was duly served on CIC, it failed to remove the wrongful lien until 
the lower court ordered it to do so. Because CIC took far more than 10 days to remove 
the wrongful lien, Vanessa was properly awarded treble damages, attorney's fees, and 
costs pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-4(2). Thus the Court should affirm on Issue No. 4 
Issue No. 5 on appeal asserts arguments regarding an examination of attorney's 
fees. This new issue was never raised before the lower court, and is improperly raised on 
appeal. The Court should not entertain the new theory, and should affirm the lower 
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court's decision because the award was appropriately within the trial court's discretion. 
In the alternative that any portion of the attorney's fees award is not affirmed, the Court 
should remand to the lower court for a determination on Vanessa's alternate theories for 
recovering her attorney's fees and costs. 
Issue No. 6 on appeal was never certified by the lower court for appeal, and is 
unappealable since CIC is still pursuing its causes of action against Brook. The issue has 
improperly been brought before this court. Accordingly the Court should not address the 
issue. 
The Court should award Vanessa Nuttall her reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred on appeal pursuant to rules 24 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1; The REPC did not create a valid interest in real property. 
CIC appeals whether the trial court erred in its determination that a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract, signed by only one of the two known joint tenants, constituted an 
unaccepted offer that did not create an interest in real property. This determination by the 
lower court is first one of fact, and second, one of law since the lower court considered 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the REPC, then applied the law to the REPC. "We uphold 
a trial court's findings of fact unless they are 'clearly erroneous.'" Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'nofUtah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). The subsequent interpretation of the 
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law based on those facts is reviewed for correctness. Nova Casualtv Co. v. Able Constr., 
Inc., 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
It is important to note that the evidence regarding what interest, if any CIC 
obtained in the property by virtue of the REPC was considered as part of Vanessa's 
Motion to Nullify Wrongful lien. On that motion, the lower court properly weighed the 
evidence and made findings of fact, and the issue of whether or not CIC had an interest in 
the property was not a necessary element to determining Vanessa's Motion to for 
Summary Judgment2. CIC's reference to interpreting the facts in a manner most 
favorable to CIC (Brief of Appellant, p. 15) does not belong in the discussion regarding 
the REPC and what interest it may have created. Because this is not a consideration for 
Summary Judgment, but rather a factual finding on the Wrongful Lien motion, it is 
reviewed for clear error. 
An important factual determination made by the lower court was its finding that 
CIC had knowledge that Vanessa as joint owner of the Herriman property when it 
negotiated the deal, and that CIC knew from the outset that it needed Vanessa's consent 
in order to obtain acceptance of its offer to purchase. In its findings of fact, the lower 
court could have believed CIC when it contended to be unaware of both owners (as if the 
2 Summary Judgment was granted on the basis that CIC had no contract with Vanessa, 
nor did it assert any cause of action that was directed to her and not to Brook. The lower 
court concluded that it was obvious that the contract was between Brook and CIC that it 
had nothing to do with Vanessa. 
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public record in CIC's possession was void of reference to both owners), or it could have 
believed Vanessa and Brook, who each provided testimony that CIC was aware of 
Vanessa's ownership (R. 10-13, 49-51). 
CIC asserts in its brief that only after being advised did Travis Bell want Vanessa's 
signature, but his affidavit says otherwise. While meeting with Brook, once Mr. Bell 
obtained Book's signature, he immediately told Brook that he wanted Vanessa's signature 
too. R. 139, <[fl[ 13-18. Mr. Bell did not receive advise from anyone before he sought 
Vanessa's signature, he sought it from the get go. In fact, he claims to have repeatedly 
called Vanessa to obtain her signature. The lower court believed that Mr. Bell did in fact 
know he needed Vanessa's signature, and that is why he continually sought it. T 9/9/05 at 
6:24-7:5. The record is clear that CIC by its actions indicated that it knew Vanessa was 
on title, and that her signature would be necessary to obtain the sellers' acceptance of its 
offer to purchase the entire property. The trial court believed the Defendants and found 
that "On May 5, 2005, Travis Bell was aware that Vanessa Nuttall owned the property 
with Brook L. Nuttall." R. 299, ^|5. Based on the overwhelming weight of evidence 
before the lower court, this finding was not clearly erroneous. 
Having established that CIC knew that it needed to obtain an acceptance from both 
owners, we now turn to the effect of the partially executed REPC. Although CIC's brief 
repeatedly insists that the REPC was fully executed, based on Mr. Bell's incessant efforts 
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to get Vanessa to sign the REPC, it is clear that the REPC was not fully executed, and that 
the real story is that CIC failed in its repeated attempts to attain full execution. It goes 
against reason to believe that CIC had a fully executed REPC, but that it for some 
unknown reason continued to pressure Vanessa in an attempt to coerce her to finalize the 
deal. 
Utah Code §38-9-1(6) specifically defines a wrongful lien as: 
any document that purports to create a lien of encumbrance on an owner's 
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized 
pursuant to a document signed by the owner of real property. 
UCA §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added on the subsections at issue in this appeal). 
CIC's Notice of Interest was not expressly authorized by any state or federal 
statute, was not authorized by any court order, and was not authorized by a document 
signed by both the property owners. Therefore, the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien 
that falls within the purview of Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute. 
The wrongful lien was not authorized by a document signed by the owner. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with this exact situation before, and held as 
follows when a wife failed to sign a REPC prepared for the purchase of an entire parcel: 
Defendants offered to purchase the joint interest of plaintiffs, and Sam 
negotiated for the sale of the joint interest. When Shelley did not ratify in 
writing Sam's acceptance within the one-day period contemplated by the 
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offer, the offer never ripened into a contract, and defendants were 
entitled to have the earnest money deposit returned to them. 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added); see also Walk 
v. Miller, 650 P.2d 1286 (Colo. App. 1981). Based on this case alone, controlling 
precedent is clear that no contract ever came to be. CIC negotiated for the sale of the 
entire 5 acres of property, Brook and Vanessa owned the property together in joint 
tenancy, and Vanessa never ratified Brook's signature, thus as the lower court concluded, 
"the offer thereon did not ripen and never became a valid contract." R. 299, %4. CIC has 
not addressed this case in its brief. This case is controlling and directly on point, thus it 
was correct for the lower court to conclude that the offer never ripened into a contract. 
This precedent is founded in the Statute of Frauds "If [Vanessa Nuttall] retained a 
joint interest in the property, [her] written consent to the propertys sale would be 
necessary, not because of any clause in the agreement, but because the Utah statute of 
frauds so requires." Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah, 1991) (emphasis added, 
and Defendant Vanessa NuttalPs name inserted); see also Bowen v. Jones, 2000 Utah 
App. LEXIS 266 (Utah Ct. App., 2000). Thus in order to convey the property held in 
joint tenancy, which is what CIC was seeking to do, the signatures of both of the known 
owners are necessary.3 
3 This case alone was sufficient basis for dismissing CIC's claim for specific 
performance; interestingly, Plaintiffs claim for specific performance in the complaint 
was part of the rationale for the court granting summary judgment to Vanessa because 
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CIC asserts that its notice of interest was authorized by a document signed by 
Brook Nuttall. CIC argues that the REPC was the "Complete Contract," and as such it 
"cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties" (Brief of Appellant pp. 
14-15). If this is the case, then the offer of CIC contained in its REPC lapsed before 
Brook signed the document. The plain and unambiguous language of the REPC 
indicates: 
Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and 
conditions. If Seller does not accept this offer by 12:00 p.m. Mountain 
Time, March 6, 2004 this offer shall lapse 
See REPC ^24 (R. 251) (emphasis added). Even Brook Nuttall did not accept the offer 
prior to March 6, 2004. Pursuant to the plain language of the REPC, the offer had 
expired more than a year before Brook Nuttall signed the document. Therefore there is 
no contract, just an extremely late acceptance by one of two then-known owners. Under 
Utah law, a court cannot substitute any other interpretation to the plain and unambiguous 
language of the REPC. See UCA §78-25-16; Faulkner v. Farnswortru 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983). Therefore the REPC as an expired offer to purchase gave CIC no 
interest in the property at issue despite Brook's signature. 
Where an offer has expired by lapse of time, an attempt to accept is 
ineffectual to create a contract. Morrison v. Rayen Investment, Inc., 97 
Nev. 58, 624 P.2d 11 (1981). As a corollary, an attempt to ratify after the 
CIC admitted in court that it could not force Vanessa to sell the interest in the property. T 
9/9/05 at 14:12-16 
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offer has expired by lapse of time is equally ineffectual to revive the 
contract. 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
the lower court correctly concluded with regard to the REPC, "the offer thereon did not 
ripen and never became a valid contract." R. 299, ^|4. 
CIC contends that Brook represented that he was authorized to sell the property. It 
is contrary to the weight of evidence shown above, but the representation is not pertinent 
to the Court's decision because the lower court found that CIC knew of Vanessa's 
ownership on May 5, 2005, and that finding has not been appealed. What representations 
Brook may have made are not part of this appeal, because those representations go to 
CIC's fraud claim against Brook that is still pending before the district court. However, 
based on the evidence and testimony presented, the lower court made a factual finding 
that "Vanessa Nuttall never gave Brook L. Nuttall or anyone else authority to sell her 
interest in the property." R. 299, ^8. CIC did not challenge this finding. This finding by 
the lower court undercuts CIC's theory that it could be entitled to an interest because CIC 
believed that it had agreed to purchase an interest in the property because Brook was 
supposedly authorized to sell. Based on the findings of the lower court that are not on 
appeal, CIC knew or had reason to know that it did not obtain an interest in the property 
by virtue of Brook signing.4 
4 This becomes important in the analysis below regarding the attorney's fees award, 
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CIC cites Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Russell 
V. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) to stand for the position that a REPC 
conveys an interest in real property. The doctrine of equitable conversion, although 
oversimplified by CIC's attempt to apply it to justify its lawsuit and wrongful lien, is 
followed by Utah courts. In Cannefax, the Utah Court of Appeals said, "once parties 
have entered into a binding and enforceable land sale contract, they Buyer's interest in 
the contract is said to be real property. . . ." Cannefax, at 1379 (emphasis added). If CIC 
had entered into a binding contract that was not invalid ab initio by its very terms (REPC 
24), and if it actually contained the signatures of both owners, CIC would arguably have 
an interest in real property. But the CIC never entered into a binding land sale contract 
with the Nuttalls, therefore it never had an interest in the real property at issue. The lower 
court correctly concluded with regard to the REPC, "The offer thereon did not ripen and 
never became a valid contract." R. 299, ^|4. 
Applying Cannefax to the instant case, at the time of trial, the interest in the real 
property at issue lied with Oakridge Development, Inc. because it was the purchaser 
showing that the lower court could have awarded attorney's fees to Vanessa under UCA 
§38-9-4-(3) although it specifically did not rule on that theory for attorney's fees. 
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pursuant to a binding and enforceable REPC with both owners, and by way of equitable 
conversion, as of May 24, 2005, its interest became one in real property. It is illogical for 
CIC to attempt in a subsequent lawsuit to assert that its defunct and invalid REPC, that by 
its very terms never became a valid contract, gives it any interest in the real property. 
In Cannifax, a judgment lien was placed on real property after the owners had 
entered into a purchase agreement with new buyers. The Court of appeals held that the 
judgment lien did not attach because the interest in real property had passed to the 
purchaser upon the formation of a binding and enforceable land sale contract. Likewise 
any claim CIC may have against Brook Nuttall could not attach to the real property 
because all interest therein had already vested in Oakridge Development, Inc. via 
equitable conversion, as of May 24, 2005. 
Likewise, in Russell, the Court of Appeals indicated: "[w] hether defendants' 
interest is an interest in land or a contractual right is governed by the [a] greement 
executed by the parties." Russell, at 1247. If the contract is invalid, there can be no 
interest conveyed by the defunct document. What if any contractual rights arise from the 
faulty REPC? None. 
Even if the REPC was not invalid on its face, Cannefax dealt with a UREC, which 
is a binding agreement that transfers an interest in real estate, but a REPC is only a 
promise to convey title at a later date. The lower court understood this distinction. See T 
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9/9/05 at 37:15-39:4. CIC's attorney, talking about the effect of the REPC stated likewise 
in court that: "They simply have a promise, which is the same one that's contained in this 
agreement. That at a future date they will have the ability to transfer clear title to the 
property." T 9/9/05 at 13:24-14:2. If by CIC's own contention, the REPC merely created 
a promise by Brook to convey, there was no interest in the entire property conveyed to 
CIC until a binding agreement was to be later solemnized. The issue of Brook's promise 
is still before the lower court. 
The wrongful lien was not authorized by court order. 
Although this is not an issue on appeal, CIC argues that its notice of interest was in 
fact authorized by court order (Brief of Appellant, p. 17). This is not accurate. CIC 
quotes language from the Nuttall's divorce decree (R. 18) that outlines the conditions 
under which one of them may purchase the interest of the other in the property. This is 
not an order giving an interest in real property to CIC, but rather is a set of conditions by 
which either Vanessa or Brook could have purchased the interest of the other. Nowhere 
in the Record does CIC contend that the conditions were met, or that Brook even 
attempted to meet the conditions. Apparently there was a mechanism laid out in the 
divorce decree by which one of the Defendants could have obtained the interest in the 
other, but since that mechanism was never used, nor was an interest thereafter conveyed 
to CIC, it has no relevance to the issues before the Court. 
30 
Issue No. 2: The lower court never addressed the ability of Brook to purchase 
Vanessa's interest in the property pursuant to their divorce decree, 
CIC appeals whether the trial court erred in holding that Brook Nuttall could not 
require Vanessa Nuttall to sell her interest in the property. This is an improper issue to 
appeal, and Vanessa believes that there can be no appeal on such an issue since the lower 
court actually never made any conclusion regarding Brook's ability to force Vanessa to 
sell her interest in the property. The lower court's decisions are attached hereto as 
Addenda 2-7, and none of them contain a conclusion with regards to either Brook's or 
Vanessa's ability to purchase the interest in the Herriman property belonging to other. 
CIC seeks to appeal whether under their divorce decree, Brook could in fact force 
Vanessa to sell her interest in the property. Although CIC made the contention that it was 
possible for Brook to force Vanessa to sell her interest in the Herriman property (T 9/6/05 
at 27:10-22), nowhere in the pleadings did CIC ask the lower court to compel Brook to do 
so.5 This is an interesting contention, but since no attempt was ever made by Brook to 
force Vanessa to sell her interest to him, the ability to do so was not before the lower 
court. In fact, CIC's attorney readily admitted in open court that certain circumstances 
that would give rise to Brook's ability to purchase Vanessa's interest never came to be. 
"We've never said that Brook Nuttall could sell Vanessa Nuttall's interest without taking 
5While the Complaint asked for specific performance forcing the Nuttalls to sell to CIC, it 
did not ask the lower court to determine whether or not Brook could force Vanessa to seal 
her interest. R. 005 at^l . 
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some further action or having some further authority to do so. That's never been the 
claim." T 9/9/05 at 10:4-7. If CIC has never made the claim, and the Record is void of 
any decision by the lower court addressing the issue, an appeal on this issue would be 
improper. 
It is not the role of this Court to make initial determinations that were never 
addressed by the lower court. Even if the Court were to consider this issue on appeal, 
CIC would fail because it is uncontested that the conditions under which Brook could 
purchase Vanessa's interest were never met, nor has CIC contended that they were. The 
whole argument regarding the language of the divorce decree appears to be nothing more 
than an attempt to prove that it is possible under a certain set of non-existent facts, for 
CIC to obtain title to the property through Brook had he taken the necessary steps to buy 
out Vanessa's interest (see Brief of Appellant, p. 17). This hypothetical did not aid in 
resolving the dispute in the lower court, and has no legal impact on this Court's review of 
the decision below. 
Issue No. 3: Notice to a represented party's legal counsel is sufficient to constitute 
notice to the party itself as required under the wrongful lien statute. 
It is undisputed that Vanessa caused her demand to be delivered via facsimile to 
Mr. Turner on August 18, 2007, and that it was received that same day. See Brief of 
Appellant p. 19. It is also undisputed that Mr. Turner was representing CIC, and had 
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initiated the lawsuit against Vanessa. Based on counsel's knowledge that CIC was 
represented by legal counsel, and considering the rules of procedure, Vanessa made the 
demand through her attorney upon CIC through its attorney of record. Rule 4.2 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
prevented Vanessa's attorney from sending the demand directly to CIC, and compelled 
communication only through CIC's attorney. 
Rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states that "A lawyer who is 
representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter." There is no exception to the rule. The Brief of the Appellant does not even 
address Rule 4.2. CIC's brief contends that Vanessa could have personally sent the 
demand, but this creative maneuver would not have been appropriate since counsel 
prepared the demand. Vanessa's attorney did not want to use her as a shielf for improper 
contact with a represented party. Utah's wrongful lien statute does not authorize an 
attorney to ignore an opposing party's legal representation. In fact, the statute does not 
even address the matter. The whole purpose of the service requirement is to insure that 
the lien claimant receives actual notice of the demand to remove it. It logically follows 
that the written demand be made upon the Plaintiffs counsel and not upon the plaintiff 
directly because under the rules of professional conduct it was impossible for Vanessa's 
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attorney to serve the demand directly on CIC. 
The wrongful lien statute does not address how to serve a represented party. Since 
the statute does not address the situation where a represented party files a lien through its 
attorney, the ambiguity has to be resolved by the court's consideration of extrinsic 
evidence. "When we interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. We interpret 
statutes according to their plain meaning and look beyond the plain language only if we 
find some ambiguity." State v. Burgess-Beynon, 99 P.3d 383, 384 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Since the statute is ambiguous in that it does not address how to serve the demand on a 
represented party, the lower court properly considered extrinsic evidence to give effect to 
the service provision of the rule. 
Under Utah law it is presumed that service on a party's attorney is service upon 
that party. 
Rule 5(b) (1) provides that whenever service upon a party is required or 
permitted and such party is represented by an attorney, the service shall be 
upon the attorney unless otherwise ordered by the court. It is not 
contradicted that service of [the demand] was made on the attorney who 
appeared of record in the case .... Such appearance is presumptive evidence 
that the attorney is authorized to represent the person for whom he appears 
in the action. 
Blake v. Blake. 412 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 1966) ("notice of trial" replaced with "the 
demand" to fit the facts of the case at hand). The Court had not made a ruling that service 
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in this matter should be made directly on the Plaintiff. In fact, Vanessa's attorney could 
have been disciplined for communicating directly with the Plaintiff while knowing the 
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. 
Utah statutes should be construed in a manner promoting justice. The Utah 
legislature has provided statutory guidance on the interpretation of statutes: 
The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to 
be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes 
and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules 
of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter the 
rules of equity shall prevail. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (emphasis added). The lower court was presented with 
evidence of the conflicting mandates imposed by the rules of professional conduct and 
civil procedure. T 11/15/05 at 13:1-14:11. Considering this ambiguity in the rule, and 
the inability of Counsel to make direct contact with a party he knew to be represented by 
an attorney, the lower court found that service on counsel was service on CIC. R. 337. 
Surely this conclusion serves the purposes of the notice provision in that it actually did 
put CIC on notice of the demand to remove its wrongful lien, and it also promotes justice 
by giving effect to valid service to a represented party that is responsible for recording the 
wrongful lien. 
CIC contends that under Vanessa's reasoning, CIC would have had three 
additional days to remove its wrongful lien. The interpretation is clever, but inapposite. 
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This conclusion presumes that the 3-day mailing rule found in Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure would apply. Vanessa disagrees that it would, but even if that were the 
case, the lower court found that the wrongful lien was in place for 28 days (R. 336), and 
as such, CIC exceeded the allowed window of 10 days (or 13) for removal, and did not 
remove the notice until after ordered by the court. 
Issue No. 4: Treble damages were properly awarded to Vanessa Nuttall. 
CIC appeals whether the trial court erred in awarding treble damages to Vanessa 
Nuttall under the wrongful lien statute. "The award of damages is a factual determination 
that we review for clear error." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 
2006). 
CIC did not contest the amount of Vanessa's actual damages asserted in affidavit 
(R. 278), thus it cannot do so now. 
CIC's contends that if the lien was not wrongful, then Vanessa was not entitled to 
recover damages. The Courts resolution of the issue of whether or not the notice of 
interest was in fact a wrongful lien will determine the mootness of the contention. 
CIC also argues that damages were awarded based on the wrong subsection 
because the demand Vanessa made to CIC was not properly served on CIC. This 
contention was addressed in the previous section. 
Utah Code §38-9-4(2) reads: 
If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct 
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the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a 
record interest holder of the real property ... the person is liable to that 
record interest holder for $ 1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is 
greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
Inasmuch as service on CIC's attorney was service on CIC, Utah Code §38-9-4(2) applied 
because the wrongful lien was not removed within 10 days, and it was proper for the 
lower court to award treble damages under that subsection. 
Issue No. 5: The lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Vanessa all of 
her attorney's fees. 
CIC appeals whether the trial court erred in awarding Vanessa Nuttall all her 
claimed attorney fees. On appeal, the standard of review of a trial court's award of 
attorney fees is for "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
Because the lower court determined that CIC's notice of interest was a wrongful 
lien, and because 28 days had passed since a demand was made on CIC to remove the 
lien, the Court's award pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-4(2) was appropriate, and was not an 
abuse of the court's discretion. 
The Record indicates that CIC did not challenge the amount of attorney's fees 
Vanessa Nuttall submitted to the Court, but rather CIC only argued against the various 
bases for an award of attorney's fees in Vanessa's favor. R. 305-313. Only upon appeal 
has CIC sought to dissect the invoices showing the fees Vanessa incurred. It is improper 
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to raise the new issue for the first time on appeal. "It is well-established that we generally 
will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal unless a party can demonstrate 
exceptional circumstances." Pugh v. Draper City, 114 P.3d 546, 550 (Utah 2005) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416, 430 (Utah 2005). 
CIC has not even attempted to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances that would 
justify this court taking a look at the individual invoices that were presented to the lower 
court. If this court considers the content of each invoice even though CIC did not 
challenge them before the lower court, it would effectually be placing itself in the role of 
a fact finder. For the Court of Appeals to assume the role of fact finder would exceed its 
proper role and would be wholly inappropriate. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1164 
(Utah 2002). 
Nonetheless, Vanessa properly distinguished and separately listed and detailed the 
work performed for all of her attorney's fees (R. 271-276), and the lower court agreed 
that they were reasonable and necessary to remove the wrongful lien. Vanessa really had 
no option, by CIC's own admission, she was wrongfully joined in the litigation, and 
Vanessa had to take the steps necessary to remove the wrongful lien so the property could 
be sold to Oakridge. 
Plaintiff relies on Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325(Utah 2005) to support the new 
theory (never raised before the lower court) that Vanessa failed to adequately separate her 
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attorney's fees. However, in Jensen, not all of the prevailing party's motions were 
successful, but in this case, both Vanessa's motion to dismiss (converted to summary 
judgment) and motion to nullify wrongful lien, as well as motion to assess damages, were 
all successful. There was no need to attempt to delineate the costs of one motion from 
another since they were all successful, but nonetheless Vanessa did separate these fees 
from each other (R. 274-276). Furthermore, as stated more fully below, in this case it 
would have been impossible to completely separate the time spent on the various motions 
because they were inextricably connected, and so intermingled that they were all 
addressed together in Court. 
CIC's reliance on Jensen fails to consider the rule stated in Jensen that "[i]n 
general, a prevailing party may collect attorney fees on noncompensable claims only if 
those claims substantially overlap with compensable claims." Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 
P.3d 325, 348-49 (Utah 2005); quoting Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 
26 P.3d 872 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001). The Record clearly illustrates that the motion to dismiss 
and the motion to nullify wrongful lien were so inextricably linked that they had to be 
addressed together at the same time and at the same hearings. The lower court indicated 
at the hearing on September 9, 2005 that the motions were addressed together both by the 
court and by counsel: 
MR. SHATTUCK: Your Honor, just briefly I - for a moment I thought Mr. 
Turner was addressing all the motions. I'll try to keep my comments just 
to-
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THE COURT: We did kind o f - 1 kind of- well, we both kind of started 
that, and so he did start over into the motions. 
MR. SHATTUCK: It is hard on this case to keep it separated. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, I think we've covered argument on all 
of the pending motions. Have we not? 
MR. TURNER: The only - we have, Your Honor. 
T 9/9/05 at 16:6-13, 72:19-22. The record clearly supports an award of fees for time 
spent on all overlapping issues. 
The issues were so intertwined, counsel was forced to address multiple motions at 
the same time. "I would also like to address the issue of interest in the property as this is 
essential to the plaintiffs case on our motions for summary judgment as well as our 
motion to nullify wrongful lien." T 9/9/05 at 36:13-16. Since the motions were 
intermingled to the point where all attorneys were arguing them simultaneously, it would 
prove virtually impossible to further separate the attorney's fees incurred on one motion 
as opposed to those incurred on another. Even if a portion of a billing were listed as 
dealing with only one motion, the motions ultimately succeeded or failed together, and all 
of them relied on much of the same evidence. Thus, even if CIC could argue this point on 
appeal, which it cannot, CIC would fail since the award of attorney's fees to Vanessa was 
for the motion to nullify wrongful lien that was intermingled with the motion for 
summary judgment. 
The lower court specifically found the attorney's fees sought by Vanessa to be 
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reasonable and necessary. In its minute entry of November 23, 2005, the lower court 
held: "The Court finds the amount of $5,159.50 to be reasonable and necessary for 
removing the wrongful lien, and awards that amount as attorney's fees to Vanessa 
Nuttall." R. 337. Vanessa provided the court with sworn testimony to support her 
attorney's fees (R. 271-73, 279), but CIC has failed to marshall any evidence that could 
provide an indicia of mistake by the lower court in awarding attorney's fees. Clearly CIC 
has not met its burden to prove that the lower court clearly abused its discretion in 
awarding attorney's fees. Based on CIC's failure to carry its burden of proof, the Court 
should affirm the lower court's award of attorney's fees since the award was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
Issue No. 6: CIC's cause of action against Brook for Breach of Contract is not ripe 
for appeal. 
CIC is appealing whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Brook Nuttall on Plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract. This Court does 
not have jurisdiction to review the issue since the decision is not yet appealable. It is 
undisputed that CIC is still litigating its case with Brook Nuttall in the lower court, and as 
such, the controversy between CIC and Brook has not been fully adjudicated. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
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determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
URCP Rule 54(b) (emphasis added). 
The only way CIC would be able to appeal the order granting summary judgment 
on its first cause of action against Brook Nuttall, is if either the lower court certified the 
order (see minute entry of September 9, 2005, R. 252) as final for purposes of appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or if the Court of Appeals 
issued an order granting the CIC the ability to appeal an interlocutory order pursuant to 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The lower court did not certify its order 
of September 9, 2005 for appeal, nor had CIC ever moved the lower court to do so. CIC 
cannot do so at this time. This Court has not granted any motion under Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure for review of the September 9, 2005 interlocutory order, 
nor has CIC ever moved the Court to do so. Because more than 20 days have passed 
since the minute entry dismissing CIC's first cause of action against Brook Nuttall, CIC 
cannot now seek permissive review under Rule 5. 
Since the case and controversy between CIC and Brook is still ongoing, and the 
interlocutory order of the lower court has not been certified for appeal, and since no 
permissive appeal has been granted by this Court, CIC cannot address in this appeal the 
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issue of partial summary judgment granted to Brook Nuttall. Nonetheless, since the lower 
court properly concluded that CIC's offer never ripened into a contract (see § on Issue #1, 
above), CIC has no contract upon which it can rely for a cause of action for breach 
against either party. 
The Court should award Vanessa her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
This Court should award Vanessa her attorney's fees incurred to defend this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code §38-9-4(2). 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure indicates that a party shall set 
forth in its brief any legal basis for recovering attorney fees. See URAP 24(a)(9). The 
lower court awarded Vanessa her attorneys fees based on Utah Code §38-9-4(2). If 
Vanessa substantially prevails in this appeal, she should be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees on the same basis because this legal action, including the appeal, could 
have been avoided were it not for CIC's wrongful lien on Vanessa's property, and the 
admittedly unnecessary inclusion of Vanessa in this lawsuit. 
An award of attorney's fees is further justified by CIC unnecessarily forcing 
Vanessa to defend an appeal of issue No. 2 (whether the trial court erred in holding that 
Brook Nuttall could not require Vanessa Nuttall to sell her interest in the property), which 
was never decided by the lower court. Vanessa has also been forced to defend an appeal 
regarding a ruling on new theory regarding the distinguishing of attorney's fees which 
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was never raised before the lower court. CIC also seeks appeal on and unappealable 
interlocutory decision regarding CIC's first cause of action against Brook Nuttall. 
CIC seeks to appeal whether under their divorce decree, Brook could in fact force 
Vanessa to sell her interest in the property. To the contrary, CIC "never said that Brook 
Nuttall could sell Vanessa Nuttall's interest without taking some further action or having 
some further authority to do so. That's never been the claim." T 9/9/05 at 10:4-7. If CIC 
has never made the claim, and the Record is void of any decision by the lower court 
addressing the issue, the appeal on this issue is improper. CIC alone should bear the 
expense of appealing an issue that was not decided by the lower court. 
CIC also seeks an examination by this Court of the particulars of Vanessa's 
attorney's fees; a new theory that was never raised before the lower court. Where the 
theory was not propounded before the lower court, it would not be proper for this Court to 
entertain it. It is not the role of this Court to make initial findings for the CIC under this 
new theory. Likewise CIC should bear the financial consequences of appealing this new 
issue. 
Furthermore, CIC's appeal of the lower court's interlocutory order in favor of 
Brook Nuttall was not ripe for appeal. It is only fair that CIC bear the costs and fees 
Vanessa has incurred to defend against that premature argument. 
Vanessa has incurred substantial attorney's fees and costs because of the CIC's 
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appeal of the ruling voiding its wrongful lien. She has been forced to defend an appeal 
and has incurred expenses to do so that as a single mother she cannot afford. 
Rule 34(a) provides that the prevailing party in an appeal is to be awarded her 
costs. On this basis, this Court should award the Vanessa her costs on appeal. 
If the lower court's decision is affirmed, based on Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Utah Code, CIC should bear Vanessa's 
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
In the alternative that this Court reverses any portion of the lower court's attorney 
fees award, Vanessa respectfully requests that the matter be remanded to district court for 
Judge Adkin to address Vanessa's other theories for attorney's fees, which he has not yet 
addressed, together with a ruling that should Vanessa prevail on one of those theories, 
that CIC would be responsible not only for her attorney's fees incurred before the lower 
court, but also for her fees incurred on appeal because the appeal stemmed from the lower 
court's ruling in Vanessa's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Using the language from controlling Utah Supreme Court precedent on creating an 
interest in property based on one seller's acceptance, this issue has been decided before: 
[CIC] offered to purchase the joint interest of [the Nuttalls], and [Brook] 
negotiated for the sale of the joint interest. When [Vanessa] did not ratify in 
writing [Brook's] acceptance within the one-day period contemplated by the 
offer, the offer never ripened into a contract. 
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Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added and parties' 
names replaced). 
Furthermore, the REPC contained an offer that lapsed before Brook Nuttall signed 
it, thus the REPC never ripened into an offer that could have been accepted. Based on the 
case law examined above, CIC's REPC, even if it were operative, which it never was, did 
not create in CIC an interest in the property at issue, and therefore the Notice of Interest 
in Real Estate was wrongful pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-1. Thus the Court should 
affirm on Issue no. 1. 
Issue no. 2 on appeal was never decided by the lower court, and has improperly 
been brought before this court. Accordingly the Court should not address the issue. 
Because Utah's wrongful lien statute does not address the issue of serving demand 
for release of a wrongful lien on a party that is known to be represented by legal counsel, 
and because the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct strictly prohibit Vanessa's attorney 
from sidestepping Mr. Turner, and directly corresponding with CIC, the lower court 
correctly determined that service on CIC's attorney was service on CIC for purposes of 
the wrongful lien statute. Thus the Court should affirm on Issue No. 3. 
Because CIC took far more than 10 days after demand to remove its wrongful lien, 
Vanessa was properly awarded treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs pursuant to Utah 
Code §38-9-4(2). Thus the Court should affirm on Issue No. 4 
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Issue no. 5 is a new issue was never raised before the lower court, and is 
improperly raised on appeal. Nonetheless, Vanessa properly distinguished her attorney's 
fees (R. 271-276). The Court should not entertain the new theory, and should affirm the 
lower court's award. In the alternative that any portion of the attorney's fees award is not 
affirmed, the Court should remand to the lower court for a determination on Vanessa's 
alternate theories for recovering her attorney's fees and costs. 
Issue no. 6 on appeal was never certified by the lower court for appeal, and is 
unappealable. Accordingly the Court should not address the issue. Nonetheless, since 
CIC's REPC offer never ripened into a contract, CIC cannot sue either party for breach. 
Russell indicates that a lien can be wrongful based on the circumstances. The 
lower court agreed that based on the circumstances as shown by the evidence presented in 
this case, CIC's lien was wrongful, and damages and fees were properly awarded. T 
9/9/05 at 75:20-76:4. This Court should come to the same conclusion and affirm the 
lower court's order on all issues. 
The Court should also award Vanessa Nuttall her reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred on appeal. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
If the Court does not unilaterally affirm on all issues, Vanessa Nuttall respectfully 
requests oral argument on this appeal. 
Dated this J£JQ day of February, 2007. 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN 
Chad C ShatJuck 
Attorney for Vanessa Nuttall 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, postage pre-paid to the following: 
Jay L. Kessler 
Kessler Law Office 
9117 West 2700 South #A 
Magna, UT 84044 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, LC 
P.O. Box 95921 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
on this ^t i /, day of February, 2007. 
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Addendum 1 
So 
COMMERCIAL - INDUSTRIAL - INVESTMENT 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is a legally binding Contract. It has been prepared for the use in transactions involving agents' clients or customers. As such the Contract is 
intended to represent a reasonable effort to balance the interests of Buyer and Seller. 
Nonetheless, the Buyer and the Seller may legally agree in writing to alter or delete provisions of this form 
Seek legal or tax advice from your attorney or tax advisor before entering into a binding contract. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Buyer CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, LLC OR ASSIGNEE offers to purchase the Property described below 
and delivers as Earnest Money Deposit $1,000.00 in the form of a Check to be deposited within three business days 
after Acceptance of this offer to purchase by all parties to: U the Brokerage • the Title/Escrow Company identified below. 
Brokerage or Title/Escrow Company: Suritv Title 
Received by; 
(if Title/Escrow Company) for deposit no later than (date) 
1. PROPERTY: 7051 West Majestic View Lane: totaling 5.f ffiacre of land 
TOR TO PURCHASE ^ . „ , , 
l\c 
State Utah 
Address 
City Herriman County -, Salt Lake _ _ 
For legal description, see: G attached Addendum # yW N j g preliminary title report when available as provided below. 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include ail fixtures presently attached to the Property. The following personal property shall 
also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: Any personal property that is used exclusively in the care, 
maintenance and operation of the property and owned by Seller. 
12 Excluded Items. These items are excluded from this sale: None, 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows: 
$ 1,000 Earnest Money Deposit 
-cr . Loan Proceeds: 
• Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an existing assumabie loan D with • without Seller being released of 
liability. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance at Closing shall be 
then adjusted in cash. 
• From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following: (interest rate for first 
period prior to adjustment, if any): (amortization period): (term). Other than these, the loan terms shall be 
the best obtainable under the loan for which the Buyer applies below. 
• From seller-held financing, as described in the attached Seller Financing Addendum. 
• Other 
Other: 
0 Balance of purchase price in cash at closing 
% J3*mM TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or before W d a v s Closing shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and 
delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), ail documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions signed by 
the Buyer and the Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title 
company in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) the deed wnich the Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded. Seller and 
Buyer shall each pay one-half of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing. Taxes and assessments for the current year, 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section. All deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing. 
Perorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of D date of Closing; D date of possession; D other ____. 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within 5 hours after Closing. 
ei^^uikandfM 
disclosure or theagency 
(a) Seller has, or shall have at Closing, fee title to the Property and agrees to convey such title to 
seBmj_ 
relation; 
() feuyei^M/afeV/ ( \) /SelierXs/miiiais 
5. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE 
Buyer by L^ general • special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10.6; (b) Seller agrees to pay for, and furnish 
Buyer at Closing with, a current standard form owner's policy of title insurance in the amount of the TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE; (c) the title policy shall 
conform with Seller's obligations under subsections (a) and (b). Unless otherwise agreed under subsection 8.4, the commitment shall confonm with tne title 
insurance commitment provided under Section 7.1. 
)3 The Buyer may elect to obtain a full-coveraae extended ALTApolicy of title insurance under (b). The costs of the coverage above shall be that 
of a standard owner^ s policy shall be paid for fry the [$ Buyer U Seller. Also the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey snail be 
paid for by the J^"Buyer D Seller. See also 7.3 (c). 
7. SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER. 
7.1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Seller will deliver to the Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than the number of calendar 
days indicated below which shall be after Acceptance: 
(days) 
• (a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller: 10 
• j b j a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by 
Seller, including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment; 10 
• (c) a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing, which will encumber the Property after Closing; 10 
D (d) a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to the Property together with a current rent roll; 10 
• (e) operating statements of the Property fyr its last 3 full fiscal years of operation plus the current fiscal year through 
, certified by the Seller or by an independent auditor; 10 
D (f) tenant estoppel agreements. 
• (g) a copy of the most recent survey of the Property, which the Seller possesses, if any. 10 
Seller agrees to pay any charge for cancellation of the title commitment provided under subsection (b). 
If Seller does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, the Buyer may either waive the particular Seller 
Disclosure requirement by taking no timely action or the Buyer may notify ihe Seller in writing within 10 calendar days after the expiration of the 
particular disclosure time period that \he Seller is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at the Buyer's disposal. The 
holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to the Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the 
requirement of further written authorization from the Seller. 
7.2 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. The Buyer agrees to: 
(a) The buyer will have authorization to conduct studies, soils reports, environmental reports and surveys of the property. Buyer shall also 
pursue obtaining all necessary governmental approvals on the property and obtaining a signed lease from buyers primary tenant for buyers 
intended use. 
(b) The buyers approval of the reports, studies, surveys and governmental approvals and overall feasibility of the project in buyers sole 
discretion including but not limited to the following: 
ALTA Survey 
Phase 1 enviromental study 
Site plan 
Engineering drawings 
Soils study 
Governmental approvals of site plans and building permit of site work and building work 
Cross access agreement 
Fully executed lease with tenant 
must be given to seller before the end of the contingency period outlined in section B. 1. If buyers approval of these items is not given the earnest 
money deposits shall be returned to buyer without further authorization from seller. ^r\ ~ 
7.3 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE. CWA< ^ 
(a) Notwithstanding any provision elsewhere in this Contract to the contrary, the Buyer has J&F days after the mutual Execution within 
which to conduct economic, architectural and engineering studies; obtain environmental audits and government permits; and perform other tests 
and studies as the Buyer wishes. If within this time period the Buyer in its sole discretion wishes to void this Contract, the Buyer may do so by 
providing the Seller with written notice to that effect within the same time period. Whereupon, ihe Seller shall release, or authonze the release of, 
any Earnest Money deposited by the Buyer and the parties shall be released of all further obligation under this Contract. 
(b) The time period for the Seller's providing and the Buyer's reviewing tenant estoppels is 15 and 60 calendar days, respectively, 
beyond the time provided in 7.3(a). 
(c) If the Seller has agreed to provide a survey under paragraph 6 above, the Buyer must receive it no later than 60 calendar days before 
the expiration of the time period stated in 7.3 (a) above. If tne Seller has not agreed to provide a survey under paragraph^ above, the Buyer may 
obtain a survey and approve it within the time period stated in 7.3 (a) above. 
Seller agrees to cooperate fully with Buyer's completing these due diligence matters and to make the Property available as is reasonable and necessary 
for the same. 
B. CONTINGENCIES. This offer is subject to the Buyer's approving in its sole discretion the Seller Disclosures, the Buyer Undertakings and 
Additional Due Diligence matters in Section 7. ~
 A r 
8.1 Buyer shall have '^Qjf_ calendar days after mutual execution the times specified in Section 7.1 and 7.2 (except for tenant ^ ~ 
t^cZo^H 
estoppels) to review the content of the Seller Disclosures and the outcome of the Buyer Undertakings ano to complete the additional due diligence in 
section 7 In the event buyer is not able to complete all its work in the time frame allowed in section 8 1 then Buyer shall have five (5) additional 
extension periods for Ninety-(90) days each To exercise the option buyer shall give notice to seller and the title company prior to the expiration of 
the contract 
8 2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure, Buyer Undertaking or Due Diligence matter within the 
times provided, those items will be deemed not approved by Buyer and the Buyer shall have the right to cancel with regard to those items beyond the 
applicable dates 
8 3 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have 10 calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve Buyer's objections Seller may, 
but shall not be required to resolve Buyer's objections Likewise the Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed by the Seller If 
Buyer's objections are not resolved within the stated time, Buyer may void this Contract by providing written notice to Seller within the same stated time 
8 4 The holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's wntten notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of any further written authonzation from Seller If Buyer does not void this Contract, at the period described in section 8 1 
Buyer's objection is deemed to have been waived However, this waiver does not affect warranties under Section 10 
8 5 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8 3 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract After the buyer approves all 
is conditions and the latest of the dates which apply under this Section 8, the Buyer's EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT SHALL BE 
NONREFUNDABLE EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF DEFAULT BY THE SELLER AS ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 16 BELOW. 
9 SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the terms of attached Addendum# Jvi kwhich is incorporated into this Contract by this 
reference A^ni\ ' 'M 
10 SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Pro^ertyarejimited to the following 
10 1 When seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings, 
10 2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electncal and 
sprinkler (indoor and outdoor) systems, appliances and fireplaces in working order, 
10 3 Seller will deliver possession of (he Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller, 
104 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any pnvate well or septic tank serving the Property in working orter a 
in compliance with governmental regulations, A*y **J <* (( i^h^y^^b A < ^ k W ^ 4 - o ****- &^~^y> <"7^T /T 
10 5 Seller will be responsible for repainng any of Seller s moving-related damage to the Property, / C 
10 6 At Closing, Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer am 
will discharge all such obligations, which Buyer has not so assumed, 
10 7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the 
Property, which has not been resolved Seller will provide buyer evidence of this and a copy of a current Phase I environmental report 
11 . VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. After all contingencies have been removed and before Closing, the Buyer may conduct 
a Mwalk-throughH inspection of \he Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 101 , 10 2, 10 3 and 104 are in the 
warranted condition and to verify that items included in Section 11 are presently on the Property If any item is not in the warranted condition, Seller will 
correct, repair or replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and (if required) Lender, escrow an amount at closing to provide for such repair or 
replacement The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim dunng the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not 
include all items referenced in Section 11 or is not in the condition warranted in Section 10, shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Section 1 1 
and of the warranties contained in Section 10 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no 
substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller if the Seller is not the vested 
owner of the Property but has control over the vested owner's disposition of the Property, the Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver ttle under 
this Contract as if the vested owner had signed it 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument (together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures) constitutes the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the 
Earnest Money Deposit and the breach or termination or this Contract, shall first oe submitted to mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate 
Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the Amencan Arbitration Association Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation Any agreement signed by the 
parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall apply 
Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on \he Seller 
by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a Its pendens with regard to the action, provided that the Buyer permits the Seller 
to refrain from answenng the complaint pending mediation Also the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation 
16 DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may at its sole remedy retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages If Seller defaults, in additon to 
return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or 
sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages If Buyer elects to accept the liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to 
Buyer upon demand Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy snail be exclusive regardless of 
gnts, which might otherwise be available under common law 
\7 ATTORNEY'S FEES In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
18 DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by (a) Sections 7 1,7 2,7 3 and 
] 3 (b) separate written agreement of the parties including an agreement under Section 15 if (a) does not apply, or (c) court order 
9 ABROGATION. Except for Sections 10,13, 15,17 and 19 of this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. ^ 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to \ne Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Ail parties must agree to extensions in writing. 
Performance under each Section of this Contract, which references a date, shall be required absolutely by 5:00 P.M., Mountain Time on the stated date. 
22. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and each counterpart bearing an original 
signature. Also facsimile transmission of any signed original document and retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission shall be the same as 
delivery of an original. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or counteroffer 
where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as 
required, 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions^ If Seller does not accept this 
offerby. * " ~^~ 
return it to the Buyer. 
f 7 March ft 20Q< , 
(Offer Reference Dale)' 
DAM C&PM Mountain Time, March fc2Q04 .jhifroffer shall lapse; and the holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall 
By: 
Its: 
(IF COMPANY BUYER)1 
Company name: 
Ai^^e/C 
Address: 
Phone: KO\-7M'£VH 
f A x - 2 5 t $ - 3 W 
(IF INDIVIDUAL BUYER) 
(Buyer's Signature) 
(Print Buyer's Name) 
(Buyer's Signature) 
(Print Buyer's Name) 
ACCEPTANCE / REJECTION / COUNTER OFFER 
J§F Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
(IF COMPANY SELLER) 
Company name: 
By: 
Its: 
(IF INDI' 
(Print Seller's Name) 
g 2 c o ^ L , N ^ T T A l L 
Av f 5 Qjx>S M'.HSf^, 
Address: (Seller's Signature) 
Phone: (Print Seller's Name) 
• Rejection: Seller rejects the foregoing offer. 
J> -s~-&y 
(Seller's Initials) (Date) ^ 
"*st 
(Time) 
• Counteroffer: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the 
attached Counter Offer # . 
Addendum 2 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
West Jordan Department 
CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT, 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROOK L. NUTTALL and 
VANESSA NUTTALL, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050405325 
Judge ROBERT W. ADKINS 
The matter before the Court is Plaintiffs Objection to Vanessa Nuttall's Proposed Order. 
The Court has reviewed the Objection, Plaintiffs proposed order, and Vanessa Nuttal's response 
to Plaintiffs objection. The Court has not received a request for a hearing on the Objection. 
The Court granted Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien. The Court did find and conclude that the Notice of Interest filed by the Plaintiff 
was a wrongful lien. The Court reserved for a later hearing the amount of damages and 
attorney's fees to be awarded. The Court has elected not to sign either proposed order and has 
prepared the attached Order, which includes parts of both, as the Court's Order on both Motions. 
DATED this / / day of October, 2005. 
By 
Third 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT CO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROOK L NUTTALL, 
Defendant 
COURT RULING 
Case No: 050405325 
Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
Date: 10/11/20-05 
Clerk: deniseo 
Defendant, Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Nullify Wrongful Lien is 
granted. Plaintiff's Notice of Interest recorded against the 
property if nullified and declared to be void ad initio. 
Defendant's motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is granted. Defendant 
Vanessa Nuttall's claims for damages and attorney's fees are 
reserved for a subsequent hearing. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
West Jordan Department 
CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT, : ORDER GRANTING VANESSA 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah Limited NUTTALL'S MOTION TO NULLIFY 
Liability Company, : WRONGFUL LIEN AND TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, WITH PREJUDICE 
vs. Case No. 050405325 
BROOK L. NUTTALL and Judge ROBERT W. ADKINS 
VANESSA NUTTALL, : 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien and on Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. 
The Court having taken evidence and having heard argument from respective counsel, the 
Court having verbally granted both motions hereby finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa Nuttall were divorced on November 10, 2003. 
2. Vanessa and Brook L. Nuttall are the record title owners of real property located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah with a property address of 7051 W. Majestic View Lane, 
Heiriman, Utah, as more particularly described in the Exhibits attached to the Complaint 
("the property"). 
3. On May 5, 2005, Brook L. Nuttall signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract to sell the 
property to Centennial Investment Company, LLC ("Plaintiff). 
4. In the negotiations to self the property, Plaintiff was represented by its managing 
member, Travis Bell. 
5. On May 5, 2005, Travis Bell was aware that Vanessa Nuttall owned the property with 
Brook L. Nuttall. 
6. Shortly after Brook L. Nuttall signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract, Travis Bell 
contacted Vanessa Nuttall and attempted to get her to sign the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
7. Vanessa Nuttall never signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract with Plaintiff. 
8. Vanessa Nuttall never gave Brook L. Nuttall or anyone else authority to sell her interest 
in the property. 
9. On August 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest of Real Property with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa Nuttall are owners of the Property in Joint Tenancy. 
2. Vanessa Nuttall and Brook L. Nuttall both would have had to sign the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract to properly authorize the sale of the property, they owned as joint 
tenants, to Plaintiff. 
3. Vanessa Nuttall never authorized Brook L. Nuttall to sign the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for her. 
4. Since the Real Estate Purchase Contract was not signed by both joint owners, the offer 
thereon did not ripen and never became a valid contract, and Plaintiff never had an 
interest in the real property. 
2 
0002*95 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Interest was not expressly authorized by State or Federal statute or 
court order. 
The Notice of Interest filed by Plaintiff was not signed or authorized by the owner of the 
Property, because the Real Estate Purchase Contract never ripened into a contract that 
could have authorized such a Notice. 
Because the Plaintiff had no interest in the property, the Notice of Interest placed thereon 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder, by Plaintiff, is a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah 
Code §§ 38-9-1 et seq.9 as applied in Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000). 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered adjudged and decreed: 
Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Nullify Wrongful Lien be, and the same hereby 
is, granted. 
Plaintiffs Notice of Interest recorded against the property is nullified and declared to be 
void ab initio. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice be, and the same hereby is, granted. 
The Plaintiffs complaint against Defendant Vanessa Nuttall is dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's claims for damages and attorney's fees are reserved for a 
subsequent hearing. 
*JI Dated this / / day of October, 2005. BYT 
U U' v •*• ''^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 11th day of October, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
COURT RULING and MINUTE ENTRY to the following: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1218 W. S. Jordan Pkway Ste B 
PO Box 95921 
South Jordan, UT 84095-0921 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant 
5300 South 260 West Ste 360 
Murray, UT 84123 
Jay L. Kessler 
Attorney for Defendant 
9117 West 2700 South Ste A 
Magna, Ut 84044 
(K^iUlw 
Court Clerk 
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Addendum 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
West Jordan Department 
Centennial Investment 
Company L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa 
Nuttall, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 050405325 
Judge ROBERT W. ADKINS 
Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Assess Damages 
was heard by the Court on November 15, 2005, and taken under 
advisement. 
In the Order Granting Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to 
Nullify Wrongful Lien and to Dismiss with Prejudice dated 
October 11, 2005, this Court found that the Notice of 
Interest of Real Property recorded by Plaintiff was a 
wrongful lien, and that Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's claims 
for damages and attorney's fees were reserved for a 
subsequent hearing. The Court understood that Vanessa 
Nuttall had several different claims and theories for an 
n r . •: v "> nt~ 
award of attorney's fees and costs. The Court addresses the 
Motion under the provisions of Section 38-9-4(1) and (2), 
Utah Code Annotated. The issue for the Court is: Did Vanessa 
Nuttall sustain actual damages that were proximately caused 
by Plaintiffs' wrongful lien? 
Vanessa Nuttall's Affidavit Regarding Damages dated 
September 22, 2005 alleges that the closing of the sale of 
the property to Oakridge Development was delayed 2 8 days, 
which delay was caused by the wrongful lien. Further, 
Vanessa Nuttall's Affidavit alleges that she became aware on 
Friday, September 16, 2005 that the wrongful lien (Notice of 
Interest) had been released, and she then immediately 
proceeded to have the sale to Oakridge Development closed on 
the following Monday, September 19, 2005. The Court 
understands that a buyer would not close on the property 
until the Notice of Interest had been removed. The fact that 
the sale was closed the next business day, after Vanessa 
Nuttall was notified that the Notice of Interest had been 
released, indicates to the Court that the seller was ready 
and able to close the sale and was only waiting for the 
release by Plaintiff. The Court finds that the 2 8 day delay 
in closing the sale to Oakridge Development was caused by 
the recording of the Notice of Interest. The Court finds 
that Vanessa Nuttall was damaged by the closing being 
delayed for 28 days, and that those actual damages amount to 
$805.41, as set out in detail in paragraph no. 5 of Vanessa 
Nuttall's Affidavit of September 22, 2005- Pursuant to 
Section 38-9-4(2) those actual damages are trebled and the 
amount of Vanessa Nuttall's treble damages are $2,416.23. 
Vanessa Nuttall is entitled to her reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs pursuant: to Section 38-9-4. 
Plaintiff argues that Vanessa Nuttall did not comply 
with the requirements of the statute, because the demand for 
release was sent to Plaintiff's Counsel, rather than to 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this action on June 28, 2005. 
Vanessa Nuttall filed her responsive pleading to the 
complaint on August 12, 2005. On August 18, 2005, Counsel 
for Vanessa Nuttall served, by regular mail and facsimile, 
upon Plaintiff's attorney the letter demanding release of 
the Notice of Interest. Under these circumstances service 
upon counsel was service upon Plaintiff. Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah2d 369, 
412P.2d 454 (1966) 
Mr. Shattucks' Affidavit of Attorney's Fees dated 
September 22, 2005, indicates that the cost of Ms. Nuttall's 
reasonable attorney's fees for this action through September 
21, 2005, is $5,159.50. The Court finds the amount of 
$5,159.50 to be reasonable and necessary for removing the 
wrongful lien, and awards that amount as attorney's fees to 
Vanessa Nuttall. If there are additional attorney's fees 
after September 21, 2005, Vanessa Nuttall may augment those 
by Affidavit. 
Because attorney's fees and costs have been awarded 
pursuant to Section 38-9-4(2), the Court is declining to 
consider any of the alternative theories for awarding 
attorney's fees, that are set forth in Vanessa Nuttall's 
pleadings in support of her Motion. 
Counsel for Vanessa Nuttall is to prepare the Order. 
Dated this 3.3 Day of 
iOBERT W. ADKINS 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t 
Ov 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 certify that on the 23rd day of November, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
MEMORANDUM DECISION to the following: 
SHAWN D. TURNER 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
1218 W S JORDAN PKWY STE B 
PO BOX 95921 
SOUTH JORDAN UT 84095-0921 
CHAD C. SHATTUCK 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
360 WEST 5300 SOUTH STE 360 
MURRAY UT 84123 
Court Clerk 
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Addendum 4 
Steven C. Tycksen, #3300 
Chad C Shattuck, #9345 
ZOLL& TYCKSEN, LC 
5300 South 360 West, Ste 360 
Murray, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808 
Attorneys for Defendant Vanessa Nuttall 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
Centennial Investment Company, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa 
Nuttall, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 050405325 
Judge Robert Adkins 
This matter came before the Court on November 15, 2005 at 8:30 
a.m., for hearing on Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's Motion to Assess Damages. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, and having received evidence and 
heard argument from counsel, hereby makes the following findings, 
conclusions on the evidence: 
1. The Plaintiff's recording of its Notice of Interest in Real Estate 
(previously determined by the Court to be a wrongful lien), delayed the sale 
of the Defendants' property by 28 days. 
2. The 28-day delay caused Vanessa Nuttall to incur damages of 
$805.41. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-4 (2), Vanessa Nuttall's actual damages 
are trebled, making the total $2,416.23 
4. Under the circumstances of this case, where the Plaintiff was 
represented by counsel, and the demand to release the wrongful lien was 
made on Plaintiff's attorney, service upon counsel was service upon Plaintiff. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code §38-9-4(2), the Plaintiff is to pay Defendant 
Vanessa Nuttall her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred because of 
the wrongful lien in the amount of $5,159.50 through September 21, 2005 
(pursuant to Affidavit of fees dated September 22,, 2005), and $1,876.00 
thereafter (pursuant to Supplemental Affidavit of fees dated November 28, 
2005), for a total of $7,035.50. 
The Court hereby Orders: 
6. Vanessa Nuttajj is awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the total 
amount of $9,451.73. 
DATED and SIGNED this /7<L/ day of D 
lonorable-'TOD^t Adkins' 
District CourKlSfi'Se"^"'^"' r 
"*5ftS 
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Steven C. Tycksen, #3300 
Chad C Shattuck, #9345 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, LC 
5300 South 360 West, Ste 360 
Murray, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808 
Attorneys for Defendant Vanessa Nuttall 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
Centennial Investment Company, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa 
Nuttall, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH 
Civil No. 050405325 
Judge Robert Adkins 
THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises, hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
The Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is hereby Denied. 
Vanessa Nuttall is awarded her attorney's fees in the amount of $782.50 
necessarily incurred to collect on the judgment of December 21 , 2005 and to 
respond to the Plaintiff's Motion to Quash. Any further costs or attorney's 
fees necessarily incurred by Vanessa Nuttali after February 28, 2006, shall 
be added to the judgment amount. 
DATED and SIGNED this ?Pf)8av of March, 2006. 
Honorable Robert Adkirrs-^ 
District Court Judge 
? 
Addendum 6 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT % . ^ b tf& 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ ' /> , - > 
J&-
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROOK L. NUTTALL and 
VANESSA NUTTALL, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 050405325 
JUDGE ROBERT W. ADKINS 
~5* K y 
This matter comes before the Court for decision on the issue of whether a levy can be 
taken against Plaintiff when there is pending disputes among the other parties. The Court 
previously entered a Judgment and Order dismissing the Plaintiffs claim against Vanessa Nuttall 
with prejudice and awarded damages on Vanessa Nuttall5s wrongful lien counterclaim. The 
litigation between the Plaintiff and remaining defendant continues and is not final. 
A levy can be taken against a party for a judgment if there is an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay and there is an express direction for entry of final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also e.g., Rocty Mountain Thrift 
Stores Inc., et al, v. Salt Lake City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, et 
alx 887 P.2d 848; 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1994); Elder v. The Triax Company, 740 P.2d 
1320; 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1987); Pasquin v John Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245; 988 P.2d 
1; 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Barber v The Emporium Partnership, et al, 
750 P.2d 202; 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court has not made an express determination that there is no just reason for delay 
and directed entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Since Vanessa Nuttall has a 
Judgment and Order dismissing the Plaintiffs claim against her with prejudice and for damages 
on her counterclaim for a wrongful lien, the Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay 
Although there is continuing litigation between the Plaintiff and remaining defendant, such 
litigation has nothing to do with Vanessa Nuttall, who has prevailed against the Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that entry of final judgment shall be taken against the Plaintiff. 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS counsel for Vanessa Nuttall to file an Amended Judgment and Order 
reflecting this decision for the Court to sign. Thereafter, a levy may be taken against the 
By the Court: 
Plaintiff. /ff9Q 
'ROBERT W. ADKlfcS 
Third District Court'Judge 
2 
Case No 050405325 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for case 
050405325 by the method and on the date specified 
METHOD NAME 
Mail Shawn D Turner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & 
ETHINGTON, LC 
PO Box 95921 
1218 W South Jordan Parkway Suite B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Jay L Kessler 
Attorney for Defendant Brook L Nuttall 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
9117 West 2700 South #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Steve C Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant Vanessa Nuttall 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, LC 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Dated this fQ day of At)Ri 
Addendum 7 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
West Jordan Department 
CENTENNIAL INVESTMENT, : MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 050405325 
BROOK L.NUTTALL and Judge ROBERT W. ADKINS 
VANESSA NUTTALL, : 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court for decision on Centennial Investment Company, 
LLC's (hereinafter "Centennial Investments") objection to the proposed order and request to stay. 
Having reviewed the parties filings, it is clear there is a misunderstanding of the Ruling and 
Order entered by the Court on April 10, 2006. In the Ruling and Order, the Court neither granted 
Centennial Investment's motion to quash nor permitted Ms. Nuttall's writ to proceed. The Court 
recognized there was some ambiguity in the Court's Judgment and Order dated December 20, 
2006. Although not well stated in the December 20, 2006 Judgment and Order, the Court 
intended for the Judgment and Order to be a final judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) because there was no just reason for delay. Since there was some ambiguity, the 
Court clarified this intent in the April 10, 2006 Ruling and Order. Under these circumstances, 
the Court concludes that both parties request for attorney's fees on their related filings are hereby 
DENIED. 
Since the December 20, 2006 Judgment and Order is a final, appealable judgment as 
clarified by the Court's April 10, 2006 Ruling and Order, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 62, the Court GRANTS Centennial Investment's request for a ten day stay. 
ORDER 
The Court hereby ORDERS the bond amount to be set as provided in Rule 62(j)(2), 
namely, the amount of the judgment plus costs and attorney fees, plus three years of mterest at 
the applicable interest rate. 
So ORDERED this / / - , day of May, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
ROBERT W.' 
Third District Court ]i 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER PAGE 2 
Steven C. Tycksen, #3300 
Chad C Shattuck, #9345 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, LC 
5300 South 360 West, Ste 360 
Murray, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Facsimile. (801) 685-7808 
Attorneys for Defendant Vanessa Nuttall 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
Centennial Investment Company, 
L L C, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brook L. Nuttall and Vanessa 
Nuttall, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 050405325 
Judge Robert Adkins 
Upon Defendant Vanessa Nuttall's Motion for Writ of Execution against 
the Plaintiff, the Court having reviewed the pleadings, and having conducted 
independent research of the law on the final judgments, hereby makes the 
following findings, conclusions: 
1. There is no just reason for delay in entering this final judgment against 
the Plaintiff in this matter 
The Court hereby concludes pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
p. r^ ; 1 / — 
of Civil Procedure that this Amended Judgment and Order is the final 
judgment and order as to the claims between Plaintiff and Vanessa Nuttail. 
3. The Judgment amount of $9,451.73 issued on December 20, 2005, 
should therefore be amended to include the attorney's fees incurred to 
collect on this judgment. 
The Court hereby Orders: 
4. Vanessa Nuttail is awarded against Plaintiff a total judgment of 
$9,451.73 with interest thereon at the judicial rate of 6.36% per annum as 
provided by law from December 20, 2005, until paid in full, plus accruing 
attorney's fees and costs to recover on the judgment. 
ffky.. DATED and SIGNED this /(^ day of April, 2006 
Honorable Robert Adkir 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Judgment and Order, postage pre-paid to the 
following: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C. 
P.O. Box 95921 
1218 W. South Jordan Pkwy, Ste B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
on this yp day of April, 2006. 
0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 17th day of May, 2006,1 delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER, to the following 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PO Box 95921 
1218 W. South Jordan Parkway Ste B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Jay L. Kessler 
Attorney for Defendant Brook L. Nuttall 
9117 West 2700 South #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Steve C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant Vanessa Nuttall 
5300 South 360 West, St 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
r^JUMymrl 
^ Court Clerk 
